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(Information from the civilwarhome.com
website)
The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army.
Southern Historical Society Papers.
Vol. XVI. Richmond, Va., January-December. 1888.
"Though communicating
by signal and in cipher is as old as the time of Polybius, its application
to military correspondence and messages on the field of battle had been so
little systematized and developed when you were put in charge of the
Confederate Signal Corps, that the art might, for practical purposes, be
regarded as a new one. By judicious arrangement and administration it
attained a high efficiency, and to you largely belongs the credit for that
result."--Letter of Jefferson Davis to Colonel Wm. Norris.
The beginnings of the Signal Service in the Confederate army were about
simultaneous in the Peninsular command of General John B. Magruder and in the
Army of Northern Virginia under General Beauregard. Captain Norris, a member
of General Magruder's staff--a gentleman of scientific education and of some
nautical experience--called the attention of the General to the advantages to
be derived from a system of signals connecting his outposts and his
headquarters with Norfolk. Magruder forthwith gave Captain Norris the
necessary authority to establish the service, and appointed him Signal Officer
to the command.
The signals used by Captain Norris
were similar to the marine signals in use by all maritime nations. Poles were
erected on which were displayed flags and balls, the combinations of which
indicated various phrases, such as were conceived to be most in demand to
express the exigencies likely to arise.
Captain Norris (hereinafter to be
spoken of as Colonel William Norris, Chief of the Signal Corps, Confederate
States army,) caused to be made copper stencils, from which colored plates of
the combinations were made, and upon the same page of the book which contained
the plates were written the meanings of the combinations. The plates were
colored by Miss Belle Harrison, of "Brandon," and Miss Jennie
Ritchie, of Richmond. The system was from time to time improved by Colonel
Norris, and this was one of the beginnings of the signal service in the
Confederate States army.
The other was at Beauregard's
headquarters at Manassas Junction at about the same time--in the summer of
1861. Captain (afterwards General) E. P. Alexander, attached to the staff of
General Beauregard, was one of the officers who had been detailed by the
Secretary of War (United States) to test and report upon the signal system of
Dr. (Brigadier-General) Myer, and was consequently completely master of the
system. He organized it efficiently, and thoroughly instructed a number of men
selected from the ranks for their intelligence and good character. Most of
these men afterwards became commissioned officers in the Signal Corps.
The service was in full operation
at the time of the first conflict at Bull Run, and the third shot from Ayres'
battery in front of Stone Bridge went through one of Alexander's signal tents,
in front of which the flags were being actively plied.
General Alexander, in reply to a
letter asking for information respecting the services rendered by the signal
men under his direction, writes as follows: "Perhaps the most important
service rendered by the Signal Department in the first year of the war was at
the battle of Bull Run, and was in a great measure accidental. Very early in
the morning of the 21st, I was on the hill by Wilcox's House, in rear of our
right, and watching the flag of our station at the Stone Bridge, when, in the
distant edge of the field of view of my glass, a gleam caught my eye. It was
the reflection of the sun (which was low in the east behind me) from a
polished brass field-piece, one of Ayres' battery, and observing attentively,
I discovered McDowell's columns in the open fields, north of Sudley's Ford,
crossing Bull Run and turning our left flank, fully eight miles away, I
think,--but you can look at the map--from where I was. I signalled Evans at
once, ' Look out for your left, your position is turned.' Just as he got my
message his pickets made their first report to him of cavalry driving them
from Sudley's Ford. At the same time I sent a message of what I had seen to
Johnston and Beauregard, who were at Mitchell's Ford, on receipt of which (see
Johnston's report) Bee, Hampton and Stonewall Jackson were all hurried in that
direction, and the history of the battle tells how they successfully delayed
McDowell's progress, till finally the tide was turned by troops arriving in
the afternoon.
"The rocket incident referred
to I had almost forgotten. It was only that one night, on reports, that
rockets were seen in the enemy's lines by our stations, that they were ordered
by General Beauregard to send up rockets themselves. It was done
simultaneously at many distant points, and in such a manner as to appear to
indicate some important and general movement; and from what appeared
afterwards in Northern papers, it seemed that McClellan had something on foot
which was disconcerted by it, he believing that his plans had been betrayed.
"The Munson's Hill and
Washington telegraph was never actually worked, because General Johnston
withdrew from the advanced and dangerous position at Munson's Hill Fort before
the day fixed for it to open. Bryan was in Washington city, and was selecting
a suitable room to rent, not on Pennsylvania Avenue, but in an elevated part
of the city, from which Munson's Hill could be seen. He was to take the
bearing of the hill by compass from his window, and communicate it to us by an
agreed-upon advertisement in a daily paper, which we received regularly. This
would give us the bearing on which to turn our powerful telescope, loaned for
the purpose by a Charleston gentleman, and in position on Munson's Hill. Then
we would identify his window by finding a coffeepot in it, and by motions of
the coffee-pot, and opening and shutting the blinds, etc., he would send his
messages, and we would reply, if necessary, by a large flag and by firing
guns."
"Bryan," was Captain
Pliny Bryan, an ex-member of the Maryland Legislature, who, on the
commencement of hostilities, had volunteered in the Maryland Line, so-called,
composed of Maryland volunteers in the service of Virginia, and afterwards
turned over to the Confederate States. He was detailed for the Signal Service,
and went to Washington, accredited to the secret friends of the Confederate
States there, and with instructions that may be inferred from General
Alexander's letter.
In February, 1862, General
Beauregard took command of the Army of the Mississippi, and assigned to duty
as Chief Signal Officer Captain E. H. Cummins, of the Engineer Corps,
Confederate States army. This officer advertised for spy-glasses, as there
were none to be had by purchase in the department, and repairing to Madrid
Bend (then occupied by Major-General J. P. McCown with his forces) with a
small squad of men, who had been selected and instructed by Captain E. P.
Alexander, and a very poor outfit, set up the necessary stations to establish
communication between the batteries and intrenchments at New Madrid,
Tiptonville, and Island No. 10.
The extracts following, from
official sources, show that, though under manifold disadvantages, the signal
men Rave a good account of themselves in the first struggle for the possession
of the Mississippi river.
In his report of the attack upon
Battery No. I, by Commodore Foote's fleet, and attempt to destroy it by an
overwhelming superiority of fire, March 17th, 1862, Brigadier-General Trudeau,
commanding the Confederate States artillery, says: "At 9
P.M. Captain Cummins, of the Signal Service, went to Battery No. I and
established there a signal station, which proved of great service during the
various engagements."
Further on in his report, the
General says: "Besides the officers already mentioned, who were
conspicuous for their bravery and coolness under a galling fire, I will
mention Signal Officers E. Jones and S. Rose, who never left their posts one
minute. While shot and shell were tearing everything to pieces, Signal Officer
E. Jones had his flag-staff shot from his hands; he coolly picked up the flag
and continued to communicate his message."
Captain (afterwards General) Ed.
Rucker, commanding the battery, says: "E. Jones and Samuel Rose, of the
Signal Corps, were engaged with me the whole day in defence of the redan, and
bore themselves with great coolness and gallantry. Signal Officer Jones having
the staff of his flag shot away thrice during the engagement, seized the flag
in his hand, without looking around to listen to exclamations, and continued
his important message to headquarters."
The flag was probably knocked out
of Mr. Jones' hands by the mud, tons of which flew in the air every time the
heavy projectiles from the fleet struck the parapet. Captain Rucker says:
"Many shot and shell fell immediately in rear of our guns, while others
passed through the parapet, ploughing up the earth and destroying much of the
work." This explanation is suggested because, while it eliminates the
marvellous element from the story, it detracts nothing from the credit due Mr.
Jones for his gallant conduct. It may seem presumptuous to question the
literal truth of reports penned upon the spot by superior officers, and which,
by lapse of years, have passed into the domain of history, but it should be
remembered that official reports, written immediately after a lively action,
are worded under excitement, which has not had time to cool, and in great part
upon reports of others, for nobody is able at such times to see everything;
besides which, the writer of these reflections was himself an eye-witness of
the incidents related, through a spyglass at a safe distance, and held in his
hands, after the fight, the identical flagstaff which is said to have been
thrice shot away and which was undamaged.
Two more brief extracts are quoted
to show that the service of the Signal Corps was not those of carpet knights.
Colonel Brown, of the Fifty-fifth Tennessee volunteers, writes: "The
enemy's heavy shot and shell poured an almost incessant volume upon our meagre
earthwork, fiddling the parapet in front of our guns, ploughing up the earth
in every direction and tearing down immense trees in a manner baffling
description. The scene was the most terrific conceivable."
General Trudeau also says:
"It," the redan fort, "presented the most appalling picture of
ruin and desolation. The parapet was plowed up in every direction and torn to
pieces. Trees were hacked down and torn to shreds by the heavy shells and the
rifled cannon."
The signal men at Battery No. I had
no protection whatever--not even that of the parapet behind which the gunners
squatted when not firing--for their position was in rear of the guns, where
fell, as Captain Rucker says, "many shot and shell."
Upon the capture of New Madrid and
Island No. 10 by Admiral Foote and General Pope, the signal party escaped
across Reelfoot lake, taking French leave of the commanding generals and
paddling across on a raft of their own construction They repaired at once, of
their own motion and without orders, to Corinth, Mississippi, then
headquarters of the army, and reported for duty. The signal officer is merely
mentioned by General Beauregard in his report of the fight at Shiloh Chapel
(or Pittsburg landing) as doing active staff duty. After the battle, seventeen
men were detailed to be instructed for duty in the Signal Corps; but as
glasses were scarce, and all the country between Corinth and the Tennessee
river was heavily wooded, the men were mounted and served chiefly as scouts
and couriers while their instruction was going on and until sent elsewhere.
Among those detailed at this time
was Carlo Patti, a private of the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Tennessee
infantry--Colonel Smith. He quickly learned his duties and was zealous in
their performance. When not employed with his flags and spy-glass, he was
incessantly playing his violin. He was once sent as lance sergeant in charge
of a squad of prisoners to Mobile, and it was amusing to see the care and
watchfulness he displayed in authority. It would have broken his heart had one
of his prisoners escaped. To finish with Carlo: He remained with the signal
corps until captured off Havanna in a blockade runner in 1864. He was bound
for the Rio Grande to join General Slaughter via Havanna and Mexico,
but after his capture never returned to the Confederate States. Peace to his
ashes; he was not a bad sort of a fellow.
On falling back from Corinth, the
signal men being sufficiently instructed to go on duty were dispersed to
several points in the command. Clagett with one party going to Mobile,
Davidson with another to Vicksburg, and Elcan Jones with another to Kirby
Smith across the river. These were three good men meriting the promotion they
afterwards got. All of them became captains in the Signal Corps, and Elcan
Jones, the hero of Battery No. 1, was, at the end of the war, Chief Signal
Officer to General Joseph E. Johnston.
Although, as has been shown, the
Signal Service was in active and useful operation on several theatres of
war--in the East in 1861, and early in 1862 in the West--it was not until
April 19th, 1862, that the act was approved organizing the Signal Corps as a
distinct branch of the Confederate army, and the Secretary of War was
authorized to establish it as a separate corps or to attach it to the Adjutant
and Inspector's Department or to the Engineer Corps. The Secretary decided to
attach it to the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Department, and May 29th,
1862, was issued General Orders No. 40, A. & I. G. O., creating the Signal
Bureau, with Major Win. Norris, of General Magruder's staff, as the head of
it. No uniform was prescribed for the Signal Corps. The officers wore the
uniform of the general staff of the same grade, and the detailed men wore that
of the arm of the service to which they belonged, and on the rolls of which
they were borne as detailed men. The Signal Corps, as organized, consisted of
one Major Commanding, ten Captains, ten first and ten second-class Lieutenants
and twenty Sergeants--there were no privates, as men were detailed from the
line of the army whenever wanted, and when their services were no longer
required they returned to their respective commands.
The detailed men in all the various
branches of the service numbered about fifteen hundred, and it was a
remarkable fact, that while these men were often employed in independent
service, and were in possession of important secrets, not one of them ever
deserted or betrayed his trust. All the detailed men were instructed in the
cipher system, and entrusted with the key-word. They were also instructed in
the use of the electric telegraph. When occasion required, they became
dauntless messengers and agents, going into the enemy's lines and cities, or
to lands beyond the sea; communicating with agents and secret friends of the
Confederate Government and people; ordering supplies and conveying them to
their destination; running the blockade by land and sea; making nightly
voyages in bays and rivers; threading the enemy's cordon of pickets and
gunboats; following blind trails through swamps and forest, and as much
experts with oar and sail, on deck and in the saddle, and with rifle and
revolver, as with flags, torches, telegraph, and secret cipher.
What were the duties at
headquarters in the Adjutant-General's Department at Richmond, is best defined
in a letter of Colonel Norris' in answer to an officer, representing the
Adjutant-General, asking the question. They were, first: Management of the
entire Signal Corps and cipher system of the Confederate States army--therein
is included also (a) manufacture and collection of all signal apparatus and
stores; (b) manufacture, collection, and distribution of all cipher
apparatus--second, management and supplying secret lines of communication on
the Potomac; third, translation of cipher messages received or sent by the War
Department, heads of bureaus, or officers of the army.
The duties of officers and
employees on the Potomac are defined as follows: First, to afford
transportation from and to Baltimore or Washington for all scouts, agents,
etc., who shall present orders for the same from the War Department, heads of
bureaus, and generals commanding armies, approved by Chief of Signal Corps;
second, to observe and report all movements of the enemy on the Potomac river;
third, to secure for Executive Department files of latest Northern papers;
fourth, to obtain for heads of bureaus small packages, books, etc.; fifth, to
forward letters from War or State Departments to agents, commissioners, etc.,
in foreign countries.
In regard to sources of information
and out of what fund paid for, Colonel Norris says: "Accredited agents
constantly in New York, Baltimore, and Washington. These agents are gentlemen
of high social position, who, without compensation, have voluntarily devoted
their time and energies to this work. Among them I mention in confidence the
name of the Hon. --------. There is no secret service fund beyond the mere
pay, rations, and clothing of the officers and detailed men engaged in them.
These lines have never cost the Government one farthing since I assumed
command.
"When secret information is
received, it is transmitted to the Secretary of War, to General Bragg, and the
general whose army or department is supposed to be immediately affected
thereby; when it comes, as is generally the case, under cover, sealed and
directed to a particular general, it is forwarded accordingly. We receive
information regularly from the United States on Mondays, Thursdays and
Saturdays. For prudential reasons no record of such communications is kept in
this office, except in cipher."
To the question, "Do the
agents of the Signal Office obtain their information personally or from
friendly parties?" Colonel Norris says: "Two of our agents acquire
their information from personal observations, the others from friendly parties
within the lines." To the question, "What are the means of testing
the credibility of friendly persons living in the enemy's country?" it is
answered: "These agents were selected with great care and with an eye to
their intelligence and devotion and energy. Actual experience alone, however,
must prove their credibility."
"From the first of April to
the last of September," continues Colonel Norris on another head,"
we placed files of Baltimore papers, published one morning, in the hands of
the President next evening. New York papers, of course, a day later."
Colonel Norris gives the history of
the secret service branch of the Signal Corps in the following words: "In
the fall of 1862 the necessity of having points on the Potomac river, at
which Government agents and army scouts might promptly and without delay cross
to and from the United States, was so seriously appreciated that the Secretary
of War suggested the propriety of establishing one or more camps in King
George and Westmoreland counties, with an especial eye to such transportation.
The idea was immediately acted upon. In a short time the additional duties
were assigned to these stations--first, of observing and reporting all
movements of troops, etc., on the Potomac; second, securing complete files of
Northern papers for Executive Department; third, upon requisition from heads
of bureaus to obtain from the United States small packages, books, etc. Here
our duties, strictly speaking, ended. But as we were forced, in order to
perform the other duties, to establish a line of agents from the Potomac to
Washington, it was determined, as far as possible, to institute a regular
system of espionage. The Government having failed, however, to place at our
disposal the necessary means to carry into execution this design, we have been
forced to rely almost entirely upon the energy and zeal of a few devoted
gentlemen of Maryland for such indications of the enemy's movements as they
have been able to acquire from mingling in official circles about Washington,
Baltimore, and New York."
It was the duty of Colonel Norris
to wait on Mr. Davis every morning with the cipher dispatches from the
generals of armies and department commanders. The burden of these dispatches
was, towards the close, calamitous and importunate--reinforcements and
supplies were everywhere demanded. All looked to Mr. Davis for relief and
support. It was the cry of the king to the prophet: "My father! my
father! the chariots of Israel and the horsemen thereof!" Colonel Norris
bears testimony to the unruffled serenity of his chief through all these
trying hours--not an impatient or despondent word ever escaped him. If Mr.
Davis ever knew when he was whipped he never let anyone else know that he knew
it.
The secret cipher used by the
Confederate States War Department was that known as the court cipher, and has
been much used in diplomatic service. A key-word or phrase is agreed upon by
the parties who intend to communicate in cipher. The message is written under
the key. Suppose, for example, the key to be "In God we
trust"; and the message, "Longstreet is marching on Fisher's
Hill." It will be written thus:
InGodwetrustinGodwetrustinGodwetr
LongstreetismarchingonFishersHill
The alphabet is written out in a square, thus (rows/cols omitted, principle is
clear):
A |
B |
C |
--- |
B |
C |
D |
--- |
C |
D |
E |
--- |
--- |
--- |
--- |
--- |
The first letter in the key is "I," and the letter under it is
"L." Take "I" in the top horizontal column and run down
the "I" vertical column until it intersects the "L"
horizontal column. The letter at the intersection is "T." This is
substituted in the message for "L" in Longstreet. The other letters
are converted in the same way, and the message will read thus:
Tbturpvxnalunxgklrzfhxbaukfvdmec
Sometimes the small words were run into the contiguous large ones, and
sometimes no division into words is made, as in the above example. The last is
the best plan. If the words are separated, or if a part of the message is
written in plain language, a chance is given to guess at some of the words, of
which an expert is not slow to avail himself. How important it is not to give
such a clue will be seen hereafter.
To decipher the message, the key
was written over it, and the process by which it was put into cipher reversed.
To facilitate reading the cipher messages, Captain Win. N. Barker, of the
Signal Corps, invented a simple but convenient apparatus. The alphabetical
square was pasted on a cylinder and revolved under a bar, on which was a
sliding pointer. Under the pointer and along the bar was pasted the alphabet
in a horizontal line. The pointer was brought to the letter in the key on the
bar, and the letter in the word to be converted was rolled up under the bar
and the pointer rested on the required substitute letter. A model of the
Confederate apparatus is preserved among the Confederate records in the War
Department at Washington.
The Confederate authorities were
sometimes so careless or unskillful in "putting up" their cipher
dispatches that some important ones, which tell into the hands of the enemy,
were deciphered without much trouble. One from General Beauregard, just after
the battle at Shiloh Chapel, giving the number and condition of his forces at
Corinth, was put up by merely putting the last half of the alphabet first;
that is, substituting "M" for "A," "N" for
"B, .... O" for "C," etc. This dispatch fell into the
hands of the enemy, and first reached Richmond in a "Yankee"
newspaper translated.
A message from Mr. Davis, at
Montgomery, to General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans. Mississippi
Department, was partly in plain language and partly in cipher, in which is
found the following: "By which you may effect o--t p g g e x y k--above
that part --h j o p g k w m c t patrolled by the," etc., etc.
An expert of the United States
Military Telegraph Corps guessed that that part of the dispatch was meant to
read: "By which you may effect a crossing above that part of the river
patrolled by the," etc., etc. The guess was right, and by applying it,
the key-phrase was discovered to be "complete victory," and there
was, of course, no trouble in reading what remained of the message in cipher.
The author of the history of The Military Telegraph in the Civil War says
this meaning occurred to him at first sight, and would have occurred to any
one familiar with military affairs in that section.
The same writer makes the
reflection: "It is a question if the Confederate cipher system was any
more difficult to the uninitiated than one of the first examples of secret
writing found in history. We refer to the Spartan Scytale cipher. When the
general of the army ventured into the enemy's country, or was cut off in his
own, he communicated with the Spartan Ephors by the use of a staff called a
Scytale, an exact duplicate of which was possessed by the Ephors. The party
desiring to write, first wound a slip of parchment around the staff and then
wrote his message lengthwise with the stick. After which, when it was
unrolled, only unmeaning letters, wholly unconnected with one another,
appeared, but the receiver rewound the ribbon on his Scytale, and all was
plain."
The alphabet first used by the
Confederate Signal Corps was a modification of that introduced by General Myer
into the service of the United States. It became necessary to change it
several times during the war, as from observation of messages sent in the
field the United States signal men learned to read the Confederate messages,
while the Confederates took the same liberty with the messages of the other
side.
Early played a ruse on Sheridan in
the Valley campaigns. Finding that Sheridan was reading his signals, he caused
the following dispatch to be sent to himself by his signal flags:
"Lieutenant- General EARLY,
"Fisher' s Hill:
"Be ready to advance on Sheridan as
soon as my forces get up, and we can crush him before he finds out I have
joined you.
"(Signed) J.
LONGSTREET."
When this was communicated to Sheridan, as Early intended it to be, Sheridan
telegraphed to Washington, and Halleck telegraphed to Grant. In time, the
answer came to Sheridan that Longstreet was nowhere near Early. This telegram
was long a puzzle to the Union general. When Early was asked about it after
the war, he simply laughed.
The Signal Corps was nowhere more
useful than where the defense and operations were conducted in a field in
which water occupied a large place in the topography. Such were Charleston,
South Carolina, and Mobile. The reports of Captain Frank Markoe, Signal
Officer at Charleston, show that during the siege thousands of messages were
sent from one post to another, and from outposts to headquarters, most of
which could have been sent in no other way, and many were of great importance.
It is hoped that the length of the
following extracts from Captain Markoe's reports will be excused by their
interest:
"During the month (July,
1863,) my corps has been at work day and night. At Cummins Point (Battery
Gregg) Lance Sergeant Edgerton and Privates Du Barry, Lance, Huger, Martin and
Grim-ball have gallantly worked their post with untiring zeal and ability,
constantly under heavy fire of the enemy's fleet and land batteries.
Fortunately, I have no casualties to report, although their station has
suffered from the enemy's fire and is full of holes. As there was no other
means of communication with Morris Island, their labors have been very heavy.
They have sent over five hundred messages, and at least a third of them under
fire. As they are completely exhausted, I have relieved them and sent the men
from Sullivan's Island to Battery Gregg. I have read nearly every message the
enemy has sent. Many of them of great importance. We were forewarned of their
attack on the 18th, and were ready for them, with what success is already a
part of history. The services rendered by the corps in this respect have been
of the utmost importance. But I regret to state, that, by the carelessness of
staff-officers at headquarters, it has leaked out that we have read the
enemy's signals. I have ordered all my men to disclaim any knowledge of them
whenever questioned. My men have also been actively employed in guiding the
fire of our guns, and have thus rendered valuable service."
In his August report, Captain
Markoe says: "At Fort Sumter, H. W. Rice was twice injured by bricks. At
Battery Wagner, I. P. Moodie was shot in the thigh by a musket ball; J. D.
Creswell was struck in the face by pieces of shell, and I received a slight
flesh wound in the side by a piece of shell. These are all the casualties, I
am glad to say. The work done has been very large, as the telegraph line has
been constantly out of order for days at a time. We have continued to read the
enemy's signals, and much valuable information has been obtained. I have
temporarily changed the signals, as we intercepted a message from the enemy as
follows: 'Send me a copy of Rebel Code immediately, if you have one in your
possession.' I make the men, moreover, work out of sight as much as possible,
and feel sure that they can make nothing out of our signals."
In his next (September) month's
report, Captain Markoe continues: "Morris Island was evacuated by our
forces on Sunday night, the 6th of September. I brought off my men and all the
signal property on the Island. Lance Sergeant Lawrence and Privates Clark and
Legare were stationed at Battery Gregg, and Privates Grimball and Hatch at
Battery Wagner from the 1st of September to the day of evacuation. They were
exposed to the heaviest fire that the enemy had ever put upon those works, and
performed their duties with conspicuous gallantry. Often the enemy's shell,
exploding on the fort, would completely envelop the men and flag with smoke
and sand for a minute, but as it cleared away the flag would still be waving.
I have to report Private Clark badly burned in the left hand, and Lance
Sergeant Laurence struck on the right arm with a piece of shell. From the
commencement of the attack on Morris Island to the day of the evacuation, my
men have transmitted nearly one thousand messages on that Island. On the night
of the 5th, the enemy made an attack on Battery Gregg, which failed, and was
repulsed by the timely notice from Sullivan's Island Signal Station, which
intercepted the following dispatch: 'To Admiral Dahlgren--I shall try Cummins
Point to-night and want the sailors again early. Will you please send two or
three monitors by dark to open fire on Fort Moultrie as a diversion. The last
time they were in, they stopped reinforcements and may do so to-night. Don't
want any fire in the rear. (Signed) General Gilmore.'
"The attack on Fort Sumter, on
the night of the 8th, was foiled by a similar notice. The dispatch was:
'General Gilmore--The senior officer will take charge of the assaulting party
on Fort Sumter, the whole to be under the command of an experienced naval
officer.'
"During the attack on Sumter,
Private Frank Huger was placed in charge of the fire-ball party on the
parapet, numbering some thirty men, and assisted in giving the enemy a warm
reception. Major Elliot, commanding the post, speaks highly of his conduct on
that occasion. The enemy have been using a cipher in signalling, which has so
far baffled our attempts to read their messages. They have not used it lately,
however, and several important dispatches have been read."
Captain Markoe's rolls show the
employment of seventy-six men, of which number he lost through casualties as
large a per cent. as any command in the action. Twelve of his men did nothing
but read the enemy's papers.
Mr. A. T. Leftwich, who was
stationed in the cupola of the courthouse at Vicksburg, in 1863, contributes
the following reminiscence:
"During the siege, a
fifteen-inch mortar shell went through the top of the courthouse and exploded
on the lower floor, where there were quartered some one hundred or so men. It
seemed to me as if the whole earth had exploded, for I was in a room on the
second floor-- and need scarcely say that the horrible sight of finding
fourteen men scattered into fragments and a number of others wounded, was
terrible to behold.
"You know, of course, that we
emptied every cistern in the town and depended upon the muddy Mississippi
water in the hot summer time to quench our thirst; that we ate bread of ground
cow-peas, and depended for meat upon dead mules and rats."
An indispensable condition to the
prolongation of the war was the running of the blockade of Southern ports by
the swift cruisers built and fitted expressly for the purpose. Such were the
profits of this business that the owners could well afford to lose vessel and
cargo on her third trip if the two first were successful. No life could be
more adventurous and exciting than that of a blockade-runner. The Signal Corps
played its part here also. Every blockade-runner had its signal officer
furnished with signalling apparatus and the key to the secret cipher. The
coast was lined with stations for thirty or forty miles up and down on either
side of the blockaded part. The blockade-runners came in close to shore at
night-fall, and fitfully flashed a light, which was soon answered from the
shore station. Advice was then given as to condition of things off the port,
the station and movements of the hostile fleet, etc. If the word was "go
in," the beacon lights were set and the blockade-runner boldly steamed
over the bar and into the port. A naval officer was in charge of the office of
orders and details at the several ports, whence proceeded all orders and
assignments in relation to pilots and signal officers.
Captain Wilkinson, C. S. N., in his
interesting Narrative of a Blockade Runner, tells the following
incident illustrative of the uses of a signal officer in this line of duty:
"The range lights were showing and we crossed the bar without
interference and without a suspicion of anything wrong, as would occasionally
happen under particularly favorable circumstances that we would cross the bar
without even seeing a blockader. We were under the guns of Fort Fisher, in
fact, and close to the fleet of United States vessels, which had crossed the
bar after the fall of the fort, when I directed my signal officer to
communicate with the shore station. His signal was promptly answered, but
turning to me, he said: 'No Confederate signal officer there, sir; he cannot
reply to me.' The order to wear around was instantly obeyed; not a moment too
soon, for the bow of the Chameleon was scarcely pointed for the bar before two
of the light cruisers were plainly visible in pursuit, steaming with all speed
to intercept us. Nothing saved us from capture but the twin screws, which
enabled our steamer to turn as upon a pivot in the narrow channel between the
bar and the ribs. We reached the bar before our pursuers, and were soon lost
in the darkness outside."
EDMUND H. CUMMINS.
(Information from the civilwarhome.com
website)
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